Elections assign the right to design tax policies, so to consumers they represent uncertainty over future wealth. An election pitting a candidate who proposes to redistribute wealth against another who does not indicates one future state of the world where the wealthy lose wealth to the poor, and another future state where they don't. One implication of this uncertainty is for the election's outcome: other things equal, a voter chooses the candidate delivering him more wealth, so the interaction of the tax policies with the wealth distribution decides who wins. The literature has explored this implication extensively (see, e.g., Myerson (1993) , Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Lizzeri and Persico (2000) ) including multi-period models focusing on accumulating debt (see, e.g., Lizzeri (1999) and Aghion and Bolton (1990) ).
We are concerned here with a different implication, which can have strong implications for the first: consumers would respond to the wealth uncertainty, as they do to other financial risks, in their demand for financial instruments. If consumers can share the wealth risk by trading electioncontingent securities (e.g. paying 1 if the redistributionist wins, 0 if he loses) in a frictionless market, the outcome of the political process is quite different on all the important dimensions. The probability of the redistributionist winning is different, the amount of redistribution is different, and the timing of the redistribution is different too.
The intuition for this result is that the potential for redistribution creates offsetting risks. The dollars that the wealthy lose to redistribution match the dollars the poor gain, so the enthusiasm of the wealthy for buying insurance againt the redistributionist winning resembles the enthusiasm of the poor for selling it. If voters can share this risk with the state-contingent security, the equilbrium is full insurance; all consumers equalize wealth across the two states. This delivers both the result that wealth redistribution occurs before the election, rather than during or after, and also the result that wealth considerations do not determine who wins the election. With wealth the same whether or not the redistributionist wins, voters refer to their non-wealth preferences when making their choices. In other words, an externality of frictionless financial risk-sharing is that ideological, and not pocket-book, concerns decide who governs.
The rest of the paper is in four sections. Section 1 covers the relevant background. Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 solves and interprets the model, and Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
Background
Consumers can vote themselves other people's wealth. A candidate can communicate that he would redistribute if elected, and a majority of votes makes it happen. This would seem to have serious implications for the distribution of wealth and the incentive to accumulate wealth in the first place.
When wealth is concentrated in a few voters, a candidate who favors redistribution would intuitively have an easy win over a candidate who doesn't, and wealth would accordingly even out.
Consider a two-candidate race. Two candidates communicate how they would govern, including how they would redistribute, then there's the vote, then the governing, including the redistribution.
When the candidates' governing policies are endogenous, i.e. they communicate whatever policies they want to communicate, not just the policies that match their principles, the race becomes strategically interesting. If candidates just care about winning and not redistribution per se, they will espouse redistribution anyway, to buy votes (see, e.g., Myerson (1993) ). Similarly, political parties with ideological motives are nonetheless motivated to buy votes with transfers (Dixit and Londregan (1996) ). Throughout the extensive literature on this subject (see Drazen (2000) for a review), candidates' redistribution policies are viewed as key to electoral outcomes, being the major -or only -determinant of voters' preference orderings, and the candidates' policy choices are analyzed from this perspective. Now consider the race from the consumers' point of view. The candidates partition the future into two possible states, one for each outcome, and each consumer expects more wealth in one state than the other. So the election creates uncertainty over future wealth, and there is an extensive literature on that subject, too. The standard analysis is that consumers have strictly concave utility for wealth, so they are all risk-averse at any wealth level, so they would prefer to hedge uncertainty over future wealth by trading financial securities. The uncertainty caused by a potential redistribution is well-suited to such trade, for two reasons. First, if wealth is simply redistributed, rather than created or destroyed, then net redistribution is zero in each state. This suggests that the demand for securities that hedge against a candidate winning matches the supply. Second, the contingency that consumers want to hedge is easily verifiable, and therefore contractible.
In a complete and perfect capital market, consumers enjoy frictionless and unlimited access to a security paying 1 if a candidate wins, and 0 if he loses. In actuality, consumers enjoy at least some access. Securities contingent on the major U.S. elections trade on the Iowa Electronic Market, where there are no commissions but low position limits. 1 Securities sensitive to, but not defined by, the major U.S. elections trade without explicit position limits on the major exchanges.
Examples include municipal bonds. 2 Since financial-market access is intuitively weak for one side of this market, poor people, 3 the result we find for complete and perfect markets can be viewed as cautionary, a prediction of the economy with easier access. And since some consumers might 1 Traders can spend up to $500; see, e.g., Feder (2002 For further use, let π stand for the value of this conditional probability takes when w L = w R .
Finally, we assume that no consumer is negligible in determining the election outcome: for all c ∈ {1, ..., N } and for all s ∈ S and p, we have
where
We can summarize the model with the following chronology, illustrated in figure 1:
• Before date 0, consumers learn that L will impose ideology L and tax τ if elected, and R will impose ideology R
• At date 0, consumers trade election-contingent securities; consumer c buys x c contracts for 
Discussion of Modeling Choices
It would be simpler to solve a model with atomistic, and therefore price-taking, consumers. 5 But while that approximation is acceptable in some settings it is inappropriate here because it ruins the incentive to vote. That is, if a consumer's trading doesn't affect prices then his voting shouldn't affect the election. So we allow traders to move the market, in that the market price aggregates traders' information, though we do not explicitly model the trading mechanism. We solve for the equilibrium by first positing the existence of a price p * at which there is no further trade, and then solving for p * . There could in practice be an incentive for candidates or their supporters to manipulate the market price, as it can be taken as a de facto poll result. 6 We are abstracting from that incentive in our analysis.
One potential concern with trading before voting is that the trading could reveal exactly who wins, so that the price goes to 0 or 1. To keep the focus on non-trivial trading outcomes we assume there is sufficient uncertainty over events intervening between trading and voting that the election's outcome can not be predicted exactly with information known at trading time. So we do not endogenize the timing of the trading relative to the arrival of election-relevant news, but it is intuitive that consumers would want to take their position in election-contingent securities before a given source of uncertainty taps out, not after.
Our analysis equates the state {L wins} to the state {L's policies are enacted}. These states may not in practice be truly equivalent, due to for example the competing agendas of other branches of government. In such cases the security is more accurately viewed as policy-contigent, rather than election-contingent. That is, it pays 1 if and only if L's policies are enacted.
We model utility over wealth as separable from utility over ideology. This is the same approach taken by Dixit and Londregan (1996) . It is not hard to think of campaign positions that relate to both wealth and ideology, such as federal funding of abortions, or even redistribution itself. We are implicitly analyzing these positions as packages, combining wealth effects that affect consumers through u, and therefore interact with other wealth effects such as security payoffs, and ideological effects that are felt through v.
Finally, our representation of the effect of taxes on real activity, through δ c , is reduced-form and not intended to be a rigorous analysis of that problem, which is analyzed extensively elsewhere (e.g., Meltzer and Richard (1981) ). The flat wealth tax is an approximation of federal taxes whose incidence generally increases with personal wealth. It is functionally equivalent to the linear income tax in Meltzer and Richard (1981) , where voters start with no wealth.
Analysis
Let p * be the equilibrium price of a contract. We first take it as given, then solve for it. If consumer c buys x c contracts, then he pays x c p * at time 0 and then gets x c pre-tax in the state {L wins}, and nothing in the state {R wins}. The wealth he consumes in each state is therefore
To calculate c's optimal contract position, we need the probability he puts the outcome {L wins}, which for the moment we call Π c . With this notation, c's problem is to choose the x c that maximizes
With w L c and w R c representing c's terminal wealth in {L wins} and {R wins}, respectively, the first-order condition can be written
If Π c = 0 and p * = 1, this can be rewritten
Pure Redistribution
We first focus on the pure redistribution case, i.e., c δ c = 0.
Proposition 3.1 In the unique equilibrium, all consumers equalize wealth across the possible electoral outcomes and the outcome is determined solely by ideology, rather than the distribution of wealth.
Proof : The proof of uniqueness is presented in the appendix. Here, we construct an informationally efficient Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE). In an informationally efficient REE, the equilibrium price is a sufficient statistic for all private information. Therefore, Π c is the same for all c. Assume for the moment that 0 < Π c < 1 and 0 < p * < 1. The RHS of (2) is the same for all c, so all consumers equalize
to the same number. This number must be 1, because if it were greater than 1 then everybody would have more wealth in {R wins} than in {L wins}, and this is not possible because aggregate wealth is the same in both states. Analogously, the number can not be less than 1. So it is 1, implying w L c = w R c for all c. With wealth equalized across outcomes, a consumer prefers the outcome {L wins} to {R wins} if and only if v c (L) > v c (R), so the probability of {L wins} is π, which by assumption is strictly between 0 and 1. This also implies that 0 < p * < 1, because if p * = 1 everyone would be better off selling more contracts, and if p * = 0 everyone would be better off buying more. Market clearance follows immediately from Lemma 3.2.
The equilibrium contract price is easily inferred: Proof : Set the RHS of (2) equal to 1 and solve for p * .
Note that p * is always less than π for τ > 0. We can also solve for the number of contracts purchased:
Lemma 3.2 Consumer c buys x c = (
Proof : Set w L = w R , plug in the equilibrium value of p * and solve for x c .
This can also be written x c = (
, which leads to our next major result:
Proposition 3.2 When consumers trade before voting, the wealth redistribution occurs before the election, is unrelated to the outcome, and is the product of the probability of the redistributionist winning when votes depend only on ideology and the redistribution that would have occured without trading if the redistributionist won.
Proof : In both states, wealth equals w 0 c − x c p * , which is w 0 c − (
] regardless of who wins, and this is π times the redistribution that would have occured in {L wins} without trading. This is a big departure from the standard economic analysis of elections. When consumers can trade before voting, the wealth effect of a candidate's redistribution plan no longer affects his chances of winning, but it does affect the resulting redistribution whether or not he wins. The magnitude of the effect depends on his chances of winning, but his chances of winning depend solely on his ideological appeal. 7 The wealth effect on the median-wealth voter is not relevant.
Consumers can trade wealth but not ideology across states, and this is what happens.
Because it affects the state probabilities, the trade in election-contingent securities is not simply Pareto-improving risk sharing. Poor people could view it as a coordination problem. The redistributionist might have been an almost sure thing if wealth distribution influenced voting, but not with wealth equalized, so the net expected redistribution to consumer c goes from close to
. This is an adverse development if w 0 c <w (and δ c is small) but the consumer is better off trading than not even though he would be best off if nobody traded. The poor would like to avoid this effect of trading by coordinating if they could find an incentive compatible mechanism that implements their preferred no-trade outcome distribution. A constitutional amendment or referendum banning election-contingent trade may serve this purpose (though this vote would itself be susceptible to hedging).
Strategic Policy Choices
So far we have not specified a set of preferences for the candidates, but rather taken their policy choices as given and analyzed the consumers' reaction. However, if candidates care about the enacted policies (both ideological and redistributive) they will strategize over their policy choices.
Maximizing expected utility, each candidate must consider a policy's electability as well as its desirability. Let U L (τ, I, d) denote the preference of candidate L. 8 We assume there exists a
for all τ =τ L and for all I and d. The preference of candidate R is analogous, and to simplify we assume that candidate R prefers no redistribution, i.e.,τ R = 0. Prior to trading each candidate anounces a tax rate and an ideological 7 Our results do not depend on the hedge being perfect. If we instead assume that the contract pays off in the wrong state (i.e. R wins) with probability ε, we can show numerically (results available upon request) with specific utility and distributional assumptions that the resulting equilibrium converges to the one solved here as ε → 0.
8 Note that candidate L's utility is not a function of δc thus he is indifferent over individual wealth effects and only cares about the aggregate redistribution. This simplifies our next proposition. policy. 9 We further assume that candidates can commit to policies and negative redistribution is not possible, i.e., τ ≥ 0. At the time candidates announce policies they know the election will depend solely on v due to backward induction, and their utilities can increase with their odds of winning due either to the effect on net distribution (as argued in the previous proposition), or to direct utility from winning, or to the chances of implementing their ideologies. Therefore, each may prefer to announce more moderate ideological policies in order to increase the probability of winning and maximize expected utility. On the other hand, the choice of tax rate will have no effect on the outcome of the election. However, we have shown that the tax rate will affect the wealth distribution independently of who wins, so to cause the redistribution that tax rateτ L causes in the absence of trading, candidate L commits to a tax rate higher thanτ L . 10
Proposition 3.3 When candidates choose their policies strategically, candidate L chooses a tax rate that causes more gross redistribution than the amount of net redistribution that L prefers or expects.
The proof follows immediately from the previous proposition and the fact that π < 1.
Economic Efficiency
The propositions to this point all assume c δ c = 0, i.e., no aggregate real effect of the tax. We can allow for an aggregate real effect by relaxing this assumption. In this case we can no longer peg the right-hand side of (2) at a given number, but we can establish whether it is greater or less than 1, and this allows us to relate the aggregate effect to wealth preferences.
Proposition 3.4 When consumers trade before voting and aggregate wealth depends on who wins, all consumers expect after trading to have more wealth if the higher-wealth candidate wins.
Proof : Without loss of generality, let {R wins } be the higher-wealth state. In an informationally efficient REE, the right-hand side is the same value for all consumers. This value must be greater than one, because if it were less than or equal to one then all consumers would have more or the same, respectively, wealth in { L wins } as they do in {R wins }, both of which are not possible.
With the right-hand side greater than one, all consumers have more wealth in {R wins }.
So the wealth effect is strictly in the direction of the higher-wealth candidate. The resulting effect on the probability this candidate wins depends on the relative strength of ideological preferences. In the intuitive case where aggregate wealth decreases as τ increases, L decreases his probability of winning (holding ideologies constant) as he increases τ . In this case, L chooses a higher tax rate in economies where leftist ideology is widely popular: higher taxes destroy more wealth so all consumers have less wealth in either outcome, but L can afford this loss of voters' wealth as long as they have sufficiently high v c (L) relative to v c (R). On the other hand, if there is no ideological difference between the candidates, so that v c (R) = v c (L) for all c, we get the stronger result that consumers trade to the point where they all want the higher-wealth candidate to win. 
Summary and Conclusion
An election creates wealth risk, and a securities market reallocates wealth risk. The wealth risk created by an election with redistribution at stake is well-suited for trade, in that demand naturally equals supply. If one candidate would redistribute (but not create or destroy) wealth with a linear tax and this trade is frictionlessly available, the result is a transformed election, with wealthconsiderations separated completely from voting decisions, and redistribution separated completely from the election's outcome. These results constitute a baseline case for arguments that redistribution buys votes, or that the amount of redistribution depends on the election's outcome. For those arguments to go through, there must be some departure from our assumptions, such as transactions costs, incomplete markets, or effects of taxation on aggregate wealth. When we introduce an effect on aggregate wealth, we find that all consumers, post-trade, expect more wealth in the higher-wealth state.
Today's markets depart from the idealized trade in our analysis with their positive transactions costs, imperfect hedges and position limits. So one perspective on our results is that they warn of consequences from eliminating these frictions. Trade in Arrow-Debreu state-contingent securities might seem obviously Pareto-improving but when state probabilities are endogenous this is no longer clear. Elections are just one, well-defined, example of this endogeneity; the point applies more generally.
Another perspective on the results is that consumers' financial exposures to an election have qualitatively different implications for the outcome and net effect of the election than do their other exposures. Financial exposure can be traded across states, and risk-aversion encourages this trade.
So elections determine wealth redistribution differently from the way they determine other policies at stake, raising the question as to whether they are equally efficient at resolving distributional and ideological disputes.
A Appendix
In this section, we will first define the equilibrium concept and recall the definition of common knowledge. Second we will prove the uniqueness of equilibrium.
Definition A.1 Price p * (H 1 (s) We prove our claim in two steps. First, we show that the full information economy has a unique equilibrium. This result implies that there can be at most 1 informationally efficient REE. Second, we show that there are no partially or non-revealing REE.
In a full information economy, Π c is the same for all consumers. Furthermore, Π c is strictly between 0 and 1 by the residual uncertainty assumption. Therefore, Equation (2) must hold for every equilibrium of the full information economy. However, this implies the equilibrium characterized by Proposition 2.1. This concludes the first step.
Now we proceed with the second step that there are no partially or non-revealing REE. Suppose not. Then there is an equilibrium price p that is not informationally efficient. Equation (2) must hold for this equilibrium as well given the residual uncertainty assumption. If each consumer has equalized wealth across states, w L = w R , then
(1−Πc)p Πc(1−τ )(1−p ) = 1 for all c. This implies that Π c = p (1−τ )(1−p )+p for all c. However, Π c cannot be the same for all c given that at least one consumer has private information. Therefore, the only possibility left is But since F is a union of members of each consumer's information partition both sides of this inequality are equal to ρ(F )f (d = 1|F ). However, this contradicts the above inequality and concludes the second part of the proof. Therefore, neither partially nor non-revealing equilibria can exist.
